Usable Pasts and the Persistence of Radicalism

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History, it is often said, must be made looking forward but can only be understood looking backward. In considering the recent past, observers must look in front of and behind them simultaneously, for the events—and many of the principal actors—are still making their mark on the world. Radicalism animates both how people working for dramatic social change experience a given time period and how they remember it. The wholesale transformation of society is a rarity, accomplished through an imprecise and unpredictable combination of diligence and luck. Yet the struggle itself, its endurance and evolution, remains generative: as people work to remake the world, they remake the horizon of social change. The means to make change shift and adapt to circumstances, but people's commitment to transforming the world in equitable, sustainable, and fulfilling ways remains. Perhaps the most salient feature of the radical tradition is its ability to weather storms and generate new gusts of energy that can sustain hope in times of despair. Radicalism is persistent, and its persistence offers many lessons.

This book brings together the lessons of recent radical movements in the United States from 1973 through 2001. These years are typically viewed as having been dominated by conservative retrenchment and a realignment that saw both political parties move steadily to the right. An accelerating wave of policy undermined unions and social movements, diluted and revoked antiracist and feminist advances, limited government-guaranteed social supports, expanded police power and prison capacity, enlarged the scope of US imperialism through a series of direct and proxy wars, and enhanced the power and profits of multinational corporations and financiers. Many have dubbed this convergence of forces "neoliberalism."[1]

And yet activists from 1973 through 2001 proved tenacious in the face of upheaval, resourceful in developing new tactics, and dedicated to learning from one another. Persistent and committed, activists did more than just keep radical legacies alive. They remade radicalism—bridging differences of identity and ideology often assumed to cleave movements from one another and grappling

with the eradication of liberal promises by turning to movement cultures as the source of a just future.

To speak of usable pasts is to adopt an active and pragmatic stance toward history. The usable past is an interpretive strategy that approaches history as a renewable resource in complex service of the present.[2] From painting street murals honoring movement ancestors, to sampling speeches or protest chants into music, to circulating readers like this one, activists routinely turn to the past to assert their movements' longevity, amplify their cultural resonance, and hone their strategies. In building links to past movements, radicals clarify their commitments and remind each other that other worlds are possible. This volume works in that spirit, bringing together 164 written documents, 20 images, and 32 short essays that reflect a wide mix of organizations, campaigns, tactics, and visions. Grouped into thematic sections that reflect multiple approaches to different sites of struggle and to struggle on different scales, the book's sources reflect the modes of thinking and organizing among left-wing US social movements from 1973 to 2001.

As the first reader to document radicalism writ large after the "long 1960s," this book moves against the received wisdom about the hegemony of conservatism between the decline of the war in Vietnam and the rise of war on terror. Dominant voices would have us believe that this period offers little in the way of a usable radical past. Certainly, the context of the last three decades of the twentieth century seems to be overdetermined by reaction: a decline in real wages and loss of union power; a rollback of gains by antiracist, feminist, and environmental movements; and unprecedented threats to the social and natural world as corporations and conservative politicians consolidated their power. Other discussions of this period focus almost exclusively on fragmentation and division. Some modern liberal critics maintain that radicals of the late 1960s and onward fractured the left by sacrificing a universal class- or nation-based political project on the altar of identity difference. Others argue that the political culture of the United States broke apart under the combined weight of right-wing resentment, a spectacle-driven media, and changing norms of race, gender, and sexuality, such that any victories were inseparable from losses. Though dominant narratives of recent history vary in their approaches, they share common ground in discounting the breadth and significance of radical movements.[3]

Reaction is only one part of the late twentieth-century story. Radicals in these decades mobilized in large numbers and took dynamic action at sites ranging from prisons to weapons facilities to the nation's capital. They worked creatively, developing new tactics and forging unexpected coalitions. Their histories give the lie to narratives that make activism invisible or that dismiss interventions against injustice and inequality. We approach the period from the position of grassroots radicalism, seeing these decades as a time both of social fracture and of movement coalescence. The country experienced not only breaks in consensus but also new kinds of political debate and exchange. Activists crafted new modes of activism to challenge forms of inequality and oppres-

sion enabled by the compromises of liberalism and the ravages of conservatism. We trace the remaking of radicalism that activists effected by forging interconnections among movements and by confronting the shifting political and economic order. The radical project remained the transformation of society, which activists maintained could only be accomplished by eradicating the root causes of inequality and injustice and by maximizing the conditions for healthy human solidarity, social expression, and interdependence with the nonhuman world. As conditions for the pursuit of liberation changed, radicals embraced new strategies, ideas, and networks—responses that won concessions, built power, and altered the terms of struggle. In this way, they defined the period.

The decades examined in this book saw the entrenchment of neoliberalism, a context in which activists had to struggle against the state but could not appeal to it in the ways they once had.[4] Thus, while activists still petitioned the government—often to maintain hard-fought protections like affirmative action or environmental safeguards—they did so to defend rather than advance a progressive mantle, and they did so with little faith in the promise of the US state. Under the auspices of neoliberalism, powerbrokers from both major parties dismantled social welfare and other commitments to public good in favor of the privatization of wealth and the restriction of democratic avenues for change.[5] From the 1970s forward, the US government and economics were shaped by a policy orthodoxy that distributed wealth upward at the expense of social programs and regulations while privatizing services and resources and undermining leftward challenges. Corporate power expanded while real wages stagnated, federal and state governments cut access to economic safeguards like welfare, civil rights and environmental protections were repealed, and the police became increasingly militarized, circumscribing people's ability to participate politically. More Americans were incarcerated than ever before, disenfranchising and actively removing millions of poor and working-class people, overwhelmingly people of color, from public life.[6] Simultaneously, neoliberalism demobilized the political language of race, gender, and sexuality, turning what had been a structural critique into superficial multiculturalism.[7]

After the 1960s, the ballot box, the legal system, and other means of pursuing liberal reform increasingly failed to win responses that would address structural inequality. They failed for many reasons. The legal system was too embedded in racial and gender domination to properly adjudicate disputes about racist sexism, a problem that led antiracist feminists to coin the term "intersectionality" as a way of articulating the nexus of multiple oppressions, particularly race, gender, and class. To be adequately addressed, new issues such as AIDS and nuclear waste required a boldness the major political parties lacked, and they could not be resolved at the ballot box either. In different but related ways, Indigenous sovereignty claims exceeded what traditional definitions of rights and citizenship could accommodate. The expansion of multinational business and free trade placed corporate decision makers at ever-increasing remove from worker or consumer influence, while increasing their authority over people's lives. The state hardly disappeared—in areas related to policing, incar-

ceration, and militarization, it grew dramatically. But political elites of both major parties mobilized state power with a growing disregard for popular consent.[8]

As old roads to making change were closed down, change makers had to find or create other avenues. They had to pursue new strategies, build new coalitions, develop new tactics, rearticulate their goals, and establish new institutions to stay relevant in a changing world. Although the prospects for progressive change were bleak, they did not disappear. The disappointments of radical activism were themselves clarifying. The closing of traditional portals for achieving change sharpened a critique of how limited these outlets had *always* been. Radicals of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s often found themselves working to preserve vestiges of the liberal order even as they critiqued them. For example, the welfare rights movement opposed New Right cuts to social programs while objecting to the surveillance and miserly sums that had always structured benefits. Antiracists resisted efforts to cut affirmative action programs while noting that such programs did little to address the underlying problems of housing segregation, the racist distribution of school funding, or the immigrant poverty that US imperialism exacerbated. Feminists fought to preserve the right to abortion while also trying to expand access to it and while working against sterilization, coercive birth control, and other practices aimed at curtailing the reproduction of women of color. AIDS activists took care of each other in the face of deep neglect while demanding that the government respond to the crisis through concerted education, research, and treatment; viewing AIDS as a political rather than moral crisis, radicals advocated shifting military spending to health care, providing low-income housing to people with AIDS, and ending the criminalization of drug use and sex work.[9]

Working-class people of color, women, LGBTQ people, immigrants, and people with disabilities bore the brunt of the political and economic shifts of the era, and they faced the stiffest barriers to political power—including through previously influential outlets, such as unions. In one of the bitterest pills of the period, the hard-fought efforts to break Jim Crow's stranglehold on electoral power were undermined by the fact that most Black mayors found themselves managing if not pursuing the same neoliberal agendas as those of their white counterparts, cutting city services while enabling privatized development as federal resources dissipated.[10]

Complex realities required new and creative solutions. One key development came through the growth of intersectional feminism—that is, the effort to analyze the interdependent operation of racism, sexism, capitalism, and heterosexism, systems often summarized as race, gender, class, and sexuality. Reflecting the importance of this development, we have situated a foundational text of intersectional feminism—the Boston-based Combahee River Collective's call for an "integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking" (1977)—as the first source in this book, numbered 1.A.1. (1.A.1. indicates, as shown in the table of contents, part 1, section A, document 1. In this introduction, we use this numbering to reference where specific documents can be found in the book. We cite "snapshot"

essays, or brief analyses by contemporary writers, by the author's last name and note their location in the book).[11]

Many other documents in the volume follow Combahee in applying the kind of "integrated analysis" by which the Black socialist feminists of the Combahee River Collective defined themselves. For example, the women signing the public statement "African American Women in Defense of Ourselves" (1.B.9.) speak from their position as Black women to challenge the appointment of conservative jurist and accused sexual harasser Clarence Thomas, a Black man, to the Supreme Court. Prison abolitionists from Critical Resistance and INCITE! Women of Color against Violence (1.A.15.) draw on intersectional analysis to highlight the need for nonprison solutions to gender violence. Activists for Inez Garcia, a Latina woman in California who was prosecuted for defending herself from rape, coined the term "racist sexism" to identify the nexus of oppressions facing women of color (1.A.4a. and 1.A.4b.), and Native activist Yvonne Swan describes the denial of her right to self-defense as part of an "undeclared war" against Native people (1.A.5.). In the late 1990s, the southern-based network SisterSong formulated the concept of reproductive justice as a way to integrate reproductive health with racial, economic, and environmental politics (Ross snapshot in part 1, section A). Among other contributions, intersectional feminism has offered a tool with which to confront the interplay between state marginalization, governmental abandonment of collective well-being, and the way social justice demands have been reduced to shallow conceptions of diversity.

As they remade radicalism, activists developed a complex argument about the US state. They recognized that the liberal welfare state was not bold enough to provide social, environmental, and economic justice. It was unable to support such radical aims both because it was being dismantled by neoliberalism and because it was a militaristic carceral state to begin with. The dismantling of the liberal welfare state opened the door to threats that demanded new coalitions and strategies of resistance. Radicalism rarely wins its full slate, and yet at their most productive, activists in this period experimented and collaborated to expand their visions even further. They questioned past assumptions, crafting what might be called (following New Left theorist Stuart Hall's insights into postwar Marxism) a radicalism without guarantees.[12]

Critiques of the US state propelled some radicals toward socialism, others toward anarchism (e.g., 4.B.3., 4.C.11.), and still others toward non-Western agendas of decolonial sovereignty (e.g., 3.A.4., 4.C.10). But perhaps most significantly, critiques of the state—and the overall context of attacks on liberalism, the rise of neoliberalism, and the deepening of racist and heteropatriarchal retrenchment—drew radicals together across disparate approaches. By the end of the Cold War, radicals around the world were reassessing the ideology of the left and responding to the decline of, as well as problems within, existing communist countries. Throughout the 1990s, critiques of state nationalisms and the growing power of corporations prompted expanded visions of solidarity, spurred on by the influence of the Zapatista rebels in southern Mexico and the rapid growth of the global justice movement.[13] Radicals came to synthesize

multiple politics—anarchist, feminist, queer, antiracist, anti-imperialist, socialist, environmental, abolitionist, Indigenous—into a shared, if at times incoherent, repertoire. *Remaking Radicalism* collects that repertoire together, making it the basis of a usable past.

The Neoliberal Order: Scarcity and Violence

All radicalism must be understood in the context of the barriers and forms of inequality it faces in a given period. The political-economic regime of the late twentieth century, often referred to as neoliberalism, was marked by scarcity and violence. The start of this period saw the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam and the acceleration of economic restructuring signaled by deindustrialization and recession. The beginning of the twenty-first century brought the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, which produced a response from the United States that institutionalized the ongoing war on terror. *Remaking Radicalism* treats the boundaries of 1973 and 2001 as moments of transition, clearest in retrospective, rather than a starkly defined beginning and end. These temporal markers situate the political-economic context that radicals of the era responded to and address and that the documents in this book likewise focus on.

The twentieth century concluded in chaos. The 1970s opened with a strong, militant rank-and-file labor movement leading powerful strikes. But global trends in trade and finance converged with deindustrialization and speedup practices, an alignment that had the effect of placing a growing number of American workers at risk.[14] Many began to lose their jobs, access to public services, and union power. During the mid-1970s, the country lost its war in Vietnam, its president to resignation in the wake of massive corruption, and its heretofore unquestioned access to natural resources, as the Arab nations of OPEC refused to export oil or gasoline products to the United States or other countries that backed Israel in the Yom Kippur War. As people searched for directions forward, conservative groups stoked racism, antifeminism, and homophobia.

Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 only intensified these trends. The Reagan presidency fused right-wing reaction to faith in US hegemony and the free market while empowering the Christian right. Reagan ushered in major cuts to taxes, antipoverty programs, and social services, and deregulated industry, attacked organized labor, and massively increased military and criminal justice spending. He aligned with antifeminist and homophobic forces, rolled back civil rights enforcement, backed apartheid South Africa, and both openly and covertly aided repressive regimes in Central America. His administration expanded the federal government's capacity to make war, but largely refused to do anything about the growing numbers of gay and bisexual men, IV drug users, African Americans, women, and poor people who were becoming ill and dying in the AIDS epidemic.[15] President George H. W. Bush called for a "kinder, gentler nation," while a decade later his son, George W. Bush, described his policies as "compassionate conservatism." Yet both administrations extended Reagan's

policies of war making, racist antifeminism, hostility to unions and immigration, and an unchecked global pursuit of resource extraction and corporate profit.

Bill Clinton's 1992 election ended twelve years of Republican rule, but the "get tough" politics of austerity continued to govern the lives of marginalized Americans. Clinton's presidency further entrenched a neoliberal consensus that crossed party lines. This became especially apparent in policies enacted from 1994 through 1996, including the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a crime bill deepening systems of policing and mass incarceration, and the eradication of already minimal antipoverty supports through "welfare reform." The mid-1990s solidified many of the right's gains even as political and popular culture became superficially more open to people of color and LGBTQ people.[16] Amid this, many activists renewed their efforts to situate queer and feminist organizing in frameworks of anticapitalism and intersectional critique (e.g., DeFilippis snapshot in part 1, section A). Other radicalism that reflected these trends included organizing against censorship, against the policing of sex, and for the rights of sex workers (1.A.14., 1.B.5., 1.B.12.).

The politics of scarcity conjoined with targeted attacks on radicals, both from the government and from right-wing vigilantes. Throughout the country, states responded to prison rebellions by killing dissident prisoners or placing them in even more isolating conditions; at the same time, many journalists covering prison conditions lost either access or interest (or both). Such targeted repression was magnified by a bevy of expansions to criminal codes and sentencing policies that, together with emboldened police forces cracking down on poor communities of color in increasingly stratified urban areas, sent more people to prison and kept them there longer. Bipartisan crime bills in 1986 and 1994 rendered "law and order" the lingua franca of both parties, as successive waves of "get tough" and "zero tolerance" policies swept the country on everything from political activism and drug consumption to immigration and school discipline infractions.

This approach reached a particularly gruesome nadir on May 13, 1985, when the Philadelphia police department, under direction of the city's first Black mayor, dropped two military-grade bombs on a house occupied by the heterodox Black liberation organization MOVE and opted to "let the fire burn." Eleven MOVE members—six adults and five children—died in the attack, and more than sixty neighborhood homes were destroyed (ucker snapshot in part 4, section A).[17]

The MOVE bombing was the most severe example of a broader reactionary campaign. Several radicals were assassinated or attacked in state and corporate violence that melded the local and global. In 1974, Oklahoma union activist Karen Silkwood died in a mysterious car crash after working to expose dangerous and unsafe practices within the nuclear power industry; the energy company she worked for was later found guilty of contributing to her death. In 1990, Judi Bari, a prominent member of Earth First! who had been developing impressive coalitions between environmentalists and timber workers in an

effort to stop clearcutting (4.A.12.), was paralyzed after a bomb exploded under the driver's seat of her car in Oakland; FBI officials strangely arrived on the scene in minutes to arrest Bari, though she was never prosecuted.

This political violence reflected the brutal configurations of US foreign policy. In two especially shocking incidents, right-wing authoritarian regimes supported by the US killed dissidents who were living in the United States. In 1976, Chilean and Cuban anticommunist militants planted a car bomb that killed Chilean dissident Orlando Letelier and US-born activist Ronni Moffit in Washington, DC. In 1981, the Marcos regime in the Philippines ordered the assassination of two Filipino American radicals in Seattle who had been organizing Filipino cannery workers to democratize their union and to oppose the Marcos dictatorship. And during an antimilitarism protest in 1987, Vietnam veteran and peace activist S. Brian Wilson was run over by a train carrying weapons destined for anticommunist paramilitaries in Central America. Wilson survived but suffered a skull fracture and lost both legs.

Finally, political violence demonstrated the growing significance of the carceral state. Working with police protection, members of the Klan and American Nazi Party murdered five Communist Workers Party members in North Carolina in November of 1979 (1.B.3.). That same year, Puerto Rican Socialist Party leader Angel Cristobal Rodriguez was found dead in a Florida prison, where he was serving six months for protesting US militarism in Vieques; his supporters allege he was murdered by guards. As Cristobal Rodriguez's death showed, attacks on militants in state custody continued well past the early 1970s, when the deaths of George Jackson, of participants in the Attica rebellion (2.B.1.), and of members of the Young Lords Party and Black Liberation Army—among others—dominated the headlines. The murders of incarcerated activists were the most extreme examples through which the criminal justice system bludgeoned dissent.

No less significantly, many of those who might otherwise have joined radical movements in working-class communities of color were among the thousands killed and millions incarcerated by increasingly armed and authorized police forces and prison guards (Ervin and Akinwole-Bandele and Kang snapshots in part 2, section A).[18] Several shocking acts of violence illuminated the increasingly punitive character of US public culture and the disparate application of punishment. Police faced no jail time, and often no charges, in numerous wrongful deaths or violent altercations. One of the few times they were charged came after four officers were videotaped in the beating of a Black motorist named Rodney King. The officers' acquittal sparked a massive uprising that highlighted persistent inequalities in Los Angeles (2.C.7.). The case stood in stark contrast to responses to the brutal rape of a white investment banker in New York's Central Park in the spring of 1989. Racist demagoguery saturated the case, promoted by voices including real estate developer Donald Trump. Prosecutors sent five Black and Latino teenagers to prison despite no evidence of their involvement in the crime; DNA evidence would later clear them but not until after their release.

Meanwhile, the two white men who admitted to beating Vincent Chin, a Chinese American man, to death in Detroit in 1982, and who tried to justify the murder by referring to their rage over the success of Japanese car manufacturers, were given probation and a $3,000 fine. Other targeted killings of people from minoritized groups—including Brandon Teena, a transgender man in Nebraska, with his friends Lisa Lambert and Philip Devine, a disabled Black man (1993), Matthew Shepard, a gay white man in Wyoming (1998), and James Byrd, a Black man in Texas (1998)—generated a rash of "hate crime" laws that allowed prosecutors to seek lengthier prison sentences in the name of opposing bigotry.[19]

Many radicals insisted that the criminal justice system could never solve the problems of social violence (1.A.7., 4.C.12.). For these critics, who would ultimately populate a self-professed movement for prison abolition, prison itself was a problem—a government mechanism to quash dissent and enforce marginalization. "We need to rid ourselves of prisons," the feminist journal *off our backs* declared in a prescient 1971 editorial (2.B.2.). "They are a danger to society not only because they are schools for 'crime' (70 percent of all 'crimes' are committed by ex-convicts) but because they try to erase from our consciousness people who could possibly bring about exciting changes in our social order."

This dialectic of scarcity and violence continued after US elites claimed success with the end of the Cold War, which wound down between the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. Rather than, as some had hoped, turning to the task of creating a robust peacetime economy, the US adjusted its military targets toward Muslim-majority countries, declaring war on Iraq in 1991, then following that with twelve years of sanctions against Iraq that ended only after the second Gulf War in 2003. The discourse of US foreign policy slipped from an anticommunist focus to an anti-Islamic one. This shift was not wholly new, however, as it supported the long-standing role of the United States in the Middle East. The reorientation to antiterrorism recalibrated US imperialism and centered its racist long war on Muslim-majority countries in North Africa and South Asia.[20]

Amid this post–Cold War consolidation, the controversial presidential election in 2000 saw more than a million Floridians disenfranchised, as the Supreme Court—under the leadership of William Rehnquist, who was appointed to the court by Richard Nixon in 1971 and made chief justice by Ronald Reagan in 1986—halted a recount in that state and effectively appointed George W. Bush president. Mobilizing an agenda of Christian conservatism and white identity politics—pursued through the privatization of land, education, and public goods, restrictive assaults on abortion access and sexual freedom, and empire building—the George W. Bush administration culminated three decades of neoliberalism with a virulent neoconservative bluster. The attacks of 9/11 together with the brutal and blundered war on terror marked a new phase of US power, in the world and within its own borders.[21]

While responding to particular circumstances, each generation of radicalism points to as yet unknown futures, to worlds of what could be.[22] In facing

the problems of the late twentieth century, radicals created new ways of organizing that exceeded the limitations of their historical context. The documents gathered in this book offer only some of the many historical examples of activism across the period, and demonstrate how radicals forged alternatives to the status quo and to new crises. In the last decades of the twentieth century, radicals saw a need to reimagine solidarity. They crafted a hybrid language of class, identity, land, democracy, coexistence, freedom, and sustainability. "It doesn't matter what they throw at us because *we* make the difference," Indigenous activist John Trudell told thousands of people assembled at the Black Hills International Survival Gathering in 1980 (4.B.1.). "*We* make the decision. *We* are power." Such affirmations of strength and vision carried radical social movements, uneasily but determinedly, through the dark days of neoliberalism. The documents activists left behind offer beacons, helping to bring to light struggles that might otherwise be forgotten.

Debates, Interventions, and New Formations

The political landscape shifted significantly from 1973 to 2001, but its transformations were not always evident at the time—in part because scarcity and violence ran alongside gains. What the democratic socialist scholar Michael Harrington said of the 1970s is likely true of the period overall: it was an era in which the country was moving "vigorously left, right, and center, all at once." Activists challenged or removed some of the institutional barriers and cultural norms that oppressed people of color as well as women, lesbians, and gay men of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. Yet more liberal social relationships did not ensure political democracy, contain state violence, or promote equality. In some ways, as we have seen, the country grew less democratic and more unequal.[23] It was not at all obvious how to win radical change in the political landscape of the late twentieth century. Activists had to search for and recruit likeminded people for their efforts, and they had to work to connect their efforts to a larger project of social transformation.

Radicals in this period debated many issues of tactics, strategy, and approach without resolution. Some found a way forward in a union, some in an underground cell, others in a mass march; some found it through cultural work, some through direct action, others through community organizing. Many moved between multiple formations or approaches at various points of their lives.

Expressions of radicalism change over both space and time. Organizing for immigrant rights, for environmental justice, or against the latest US war invariably look different in South Dakota (such as in the land and resource struggles documented in 4.C.1., 4.A.6., and 4.A.9.) than in South Central Los Angeles (where the problem of too much policing and too little public transit looms large, as documented in 2.A.10. and 2.C.8.). Activists make different demands depending on whether they are organizing homeless people (2.C.5., 2.C.10.), resisting gentrification (2.C.1., 2.C.2., 2.C.3. and Quizar and Rodriguez-Muñiz snapshots in part 2, section C), protecting Black and white farmers from both

government malfeasance and right-wing militias (4.C.4., 4.C.5.), preserving public education (2.C.9. and Subways snapshot in part 2, section C), protecting communities of color from toxic dumping and environmentally racist zoning practices (4.A.7., 4.A.8., 4.A.9.), or safeguarding Indigenous land from tourism and extractive industry (4.C.3., 4.C.7, 4.C.8.). They likewise make different demands across the decades, as evident in welfare rights organizing in the 1970s versus the 1990s (compare 1.C.1. to 1.C.10 and 1.C.11, and see Chappell snapshot in part 1, section C). Efforts to stop prison construction likewise shifted and were varied (compare 2.B.5. and 2.B.7a. and 2.B.7b. to 2.B.10., and see Pelot-Hobbs and Gilmore snapshots in part 2, section B).[24]

Yet there are continuities in radicalism as well, and the basic questions are often the same. What issues are closest to home or motivate action? How can activists mobilize large numbers of people and which alternatives should they direct people toward? How do activists develop critical consciousness, find a political community, and build a larger movement? Answers differ by geography, community relationships, and local infrastructures for activism, yet common principles link people across movement sites.

We adopted a reading practice for this anthology that emphasizes process and aspiration—a framework through which major changes and features of activism over time can be traced. This tool guided our process in compiling the book: we used it as an invitation to look for types of activism that we did not already know about, to explore regions we had not previously researched, and to identify points of connection or divergence. Without imposing a uniformity that never existed, we track the rise, convergence, or dissipation of styles and approaches. As editors, we have cultivated key examples of how radicals approached political organization and social change in this time period.

We have organized the book in a way that demonstrates how radicals organized at different levels of politics, ranging from the body and home to urban and rural contexts and international and global levels. This way of organizing documents helps to show how activists understood their contexts and how they contested the political and economic relationships that brought those contexts into being. The book's organization enables the reader to compare organizing in locations that are conceptually similar but geographically distant. We hope, too, that it opens up questions not only about what has been but what might be—that it allows readers to use these pasts to imagine more just ways of organizing the world.

Remaking Radicalism maps thematic as well as physical geographies. Thinking through geography helps us to consider how designations we might take for granted, such as those of nations and citizenship, can be remade or unmade. It also can help us consider in what types of spaces movements take place. Some injustices are visited on the body, others within the family or extended kinship. Local, national, and global relationships are mutually embedded. The meanings of belonging and self-determination differ between cities and rural landscapes. Certain forms of violence and injustice displace people while others confine them. Likewise, people learn about radical politics and organizing tech-

niques through many sources: fellow students, coworkers, neighbors, cellmates, flyers, community newspapers, neighborhood associations, protests, and cultural events. The relationships through which people move into activism are situated in racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and economic communities. And these settings inflect the organizational forms that activism takes, from small collectives to large, structured unions.

We have sought to reflect the range of activist locations to the best of our ability. Some in the punk scene, for example, found radical politics by seeing members of the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee (1.B.2.) or Anti-Racist Action (1.B.8.) confront white supremacists at a music show or on the street. Many immigrant workers, isolated from formal unions by repressive labor laws, joined a broader movement through popular education workshops, hunger strikes, or solidarity marches (see, for example, 1.B.11., 3.B.11., Zavella snapshot in part 1, section C, and Kono snapshot in part 3, section B).

Several critical issues repeatedly come up across this time period: questions of organization, political process, and direct action. Radicals raised these questions both directly and implicitly as they sought to determine the best practices for social change. We leave it to readers to evaluate their answers. But we underscore that while versions of these questions have long been debated in US radicalisms, their inflection from 1973 to 2001 revealed the shrinking availability and relevance of liberal reform amid expanded corporate power and a determined conservatism across the two major political parties.

Questions of *organization* asked, above all, what vehicles were best suited to advance transformative social change. Many sought to control aspects of the state—to make government preserve or prohibit certain actions—yet disagreed over whether the government could confront injustices that were foundational to the US nation. At a more specific level, many debated whether the Democratic Party was a vehicle to be reformed for progressive change or an obstacle to achieving it. As a result of such debates, activists experimented with a host of organizing forms, including political parties, networks, collectives, federations, campaigns, affinity groups, coalitions, counterinstitutions such as co-ops, and more.

The different forms of organizing reflected differences of ideology, strategy, and power. Some national coalitions, such as the Rainbow Coalition, mobilized around presidential elections, yet others, such as Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (2.C.4.), New Jewish Agenda (3.C.4.), the Black Student Leadership Network (Franklin snapshot in part 4, section B), or the Black Radical Congress (4.B.10.), bent their energy toward strategies and platforms of grassroots change. Local organizations like the Center for Third World Organizing (4.B.2.) or UPROSE (Sze and Yeampierre snapshot in part 4, section A) emphasized issue-based campaigns. Behind these debates, too, lay the broader changes of neoliberalism. Before 1970, many activists could advance social justice through government jobs in programs created through the New Deal or the War on Poverty. As those programs constricted or disappeared, non-profit organizations became the primary place outside of unions to do paid so-

cial justice work. Yet many nonprofits focused more on providing services than community organizing or movement building. Further, regardless of their tactics, nonprofits risked prioritizing funder interests over community needs.

The reemergence of social justice unionism in the 1990s (as in 1.C.12. and 3.B.4.) offered some promise for overcoming these limitations, at least in several major cities.[25] But the dependence of unions on the Democratic Party and of nonprofits on foundations heightened radicals' desire for alternatives.[26] Many progressives, Marxists, and socialists debated whether to push the Democratic Party to the left or to build a third-party alternative. Pursuing the latter option gave rise to a number of Marxist and radical nationalist party formations; in the 1990s it generated the Green Party, Labor Party (4.B.9.), and New Party. Efforts to elect Black and other people of color fueled Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and his two presidential runs, which were replicated at the local level in several cities, such as Harold Washington's successful campaign for mayor of Chicago that upended the city's traditional political machine.

Yet critiques of state power, of flaws in socialist and national liberation projects, and of neoliberal and imperialist bipartisan consensus prompted many to turn away from investing in any future state. Radicals of many stripes—Marxist, socialist, revolutionary nationalist, anti-imperialist, anarchist, queer, feminist, or otherwise—prioritized community organizing, cultural work, or direct action protests over the electoral realm. Large numbers of radicals focused their energy on strategies of affinity group organizing and providing mutual aid (see, for example, 2.A.12., 4.A.1a–d., 4.A.5., 4.B.8. and Wood snapshot in part 4, section B).[27]

As radicals experimented with different organizational forms, they took up questions of how to organize in ways that did not reproduce the errors of the past. This led many to emphasize *accountability and political process*. With these concerns, activists sought to attend to questions of democracy and equity in how they worked together. Feminists and anarchists honed models of what Bruce Kokopeli and George Lakey describe as shared leadership (4.A.4.) and consensus decision making and brought these tools to settings ranging from mass mobilizations to tiny collectives (4.A.3.). Yet what tools of process worked best depended on context, as organizations sought to balance the greatest level of participation with rapid responses to each moment's urgency. Increasingly, many argued that transformative change demanded multiracial, mixed-gender, cross-class organizations guided by the emancipatory leadership and membership of working-class women of color, immigrants, and others who were commonly marginalized. They struggled with how to build such organizations while also drawing more privileged people into activism against oppression that centered the most affected.

These questions held particular weight in transnational activism, including efforts to oppose US military intervention and advance global economic justice. The vast majority of US activists, even in working-class and poor communities, had far greater access to money and media than most people in the global South. Yet most US activists lacked deep knowledge of sites or struggles

outside the United States, and some suffered from a tendency to romanticize or exoticize non-Western leadership. Immigrants and refugees brought rich expertise into US-based organizing (e.g., 3.A.1., 3.B.5., 3.B.11., 3.C.1., 3.C.2.). Yet many born in the United States were unaware of such legacies. All these dynamics raised serious obstacles, and activists struggled to confront them, as for example in the Central American solidarity movement (3.A.7. through 3.A.14.), immigrant labor organizing (1.B.11., 3.B.12.), activism against US war in the Middle East (3.C.7a–b. through 3.C.12.), and movements pursuing the sovereignty that had been usurped by US settler colonialism (see especially part 4, section C, including Molina snapshot). Transnational organizing demanded confronting the legacies of empire within movements themselves. Yet it also opened up new means to build power—as by identifying diasporic sources for labor militancy, linking students of color and white students in campus anti-apartheid activism, or naming antiracism and queer liberation as central principles of global justice (see especially 3.A.9., 3.A.10., 3.C.8., and Cable snapshot in part 3, section C).[28]

As the traditional mechanisms of liberal reforms yielded fewer avenues for change, activists in this period took up diverse modes of *direct action*. Across the period covered in this book, the tactic of large-scale disruptive protest, particularly through mass convenings and efforts to interrupt the work of government and corporations, came into its own. Direct action secured especially high levels of participation in the antinuclear (part 4, section A), Central American solidarity (part 4, section A), anti-apartheid (part 3, section B), AIDS (1.A.9. through 1.A.12, 1.C.9., 2.B.10.), and global justice movements (part 3, section B). The majority of this direct action entailed nonviolent civil disobedience, as demonstrated by documents from the Clamshell Alliance and feminist campaigns against nuclear weapons (3.A.6., 4.A.1a.–d., 4.A.2a–b, 4.A.3) as well as efforts to secure abortion access (1.B.6., 1.B.7.). In the "Battle of Seattle," fifty thousand people from different social justice movements shut down the meeting of the World Trade Organization (3.B.8a–b.).

Major demonstrations increasingly featured direct action manuals outlining everything from which streets to block to legal, medical, and media advice for civil disobedience actions (4.A.1a–d.). Activists increasingly utilized spectacle, in the form of puppets, parody, and other creative disruptions. They made growing use of video to document actions and to seek a measure of safety (Cheng snapshot in part 1, section A). They also moved beyond the scripted pageantry of traditional marches and rallies and added long-term occupations of space to their tactics through encampments outside weapons manufacturers, nuclear power plants, campuses, federal agencies, and global meetings (Dixon snapshot in part 3, section B, Fulkerson snapshot in part 4, section A, Hall snapshot in part 3, section B, Wood snapshot in part 4, section B).[29]

Documents throughout *Remaking Radicalism* reflect struggles over means versus ends in direct action organizing. These questions were not new to the period, but they took on particular urgency as radicals contended with geopolitical shifts and nuclear or environmental annihilation. Some questions related to the tensions between movement culture and popular impact. While street the-

ater drew media attention and buoyed activist energy, it was not always clear when it built political power. Other questions revolved around what kinds of actions were most strategically useful and morally defensible. Was nonviolence always necessary, or did it unethically preserve the state's monopoly on violence? Did property destruction count as violence, and was it worth the cost in potential harm or incarceration? Was violence a dead-end strategy that only alienated the left from popular support? What were the relationships and differences between self-determination, self-defense, and armed struggle?

Over the 1973 through 2001 period, some radicals continued deploying underground tactics against police and prison brutality (2.A.6., 2.B.4.), imperial aggression (3.A.2.), and the growing threat of ecological collapse (4.A.14., 4.A.15.). Violent action particularly continued in the 1970s and 1980s, typically through bombings of government or corporate buildings that were carried out after hours to avoid injuries while still drawing attention to specific issues. Organizers typically announced these actions with public messages that articulated their analyses of state and structural violence, targeting agencies ranging from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1.C.4.) to the War College (3.A.7.). From policing to militarism, racist sterilization abuse to environmental destruction, seemingly every major issue generated an armed response. American guerrillas drew inspiration from armed struggle in socialist and national liberation movements worldwide. Some armed groups in the United States financed themselves through risky and at times fatal bank robberies; at least one, the Black Liberation Army, killed several police officers in targeted attacks in the 1970s. As many of the documents in sections A and B of part 2 demonstrate, armed struggle was linked to mass incarceration. Some radicals viewed the violence of incarceration as license for their own use of force. More generally, armed tactics resulted in lengthy or life sentences for many participants, often in newly designed isolation units (2.B.9., 2.B.10.).

The use of armed struggle on the left declined in the United States by the late 1980s. By the time of the Oklahoma City bombing and the September 11 attacks, nonstate political violence had become largely the province of right-wing militants, who adopted far more lethal forms of violence designed to cause maximal harm. By the 1990s, perhaps the only left-wing clandestine groups operating in the United States were the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front (4.A.14., 4.A.15.), both of which caused millions of dollars in damage through sabotage and vandalism without causing human injury.[30]

Activists disagreed—often quite sharply—over many strategies and tactics. Yet even with these differences, radicals of this period shared a goal of drawing connections across issues, geographies, and communities without displacing the insights born of differing experiences and identities. This orientation, both strategic and aspirational, produced linkages between struggles as seemingly disparate as Indigenous sovereignty and prison abolition, reproductive justice and immigrant rights, queer liberation and movements supporting freedom in Central America, South Africa, and Palestine. As disarmament activist Joseph Gerson put it in 1986—responding, in part, to the peace movement's relative

silence on Israel's invasion of Lebanon—"The lesson is being learned that focusing individual or organizational efforts on only the nuclear arms race or on only one manifestation of intervention often fragments and weakens the struggle for peace, justice, and survival" (3.C.5.). Forging solidarity through grassroots action generated movement power and radical possibility.

Organization of the Anthology

Remaking Radicalism is aimed at everyone interested in the recent history of radicalism and the radical history of the recent past. We have designed the book with the hope that it will be used in classrooms, study groups, and other sites where people study social movements and the issues that surround them. While treating the 1973 to 2001 period as a distinct era, we include a few documents from as early as 1970 and as late as 2003, using these to illustrate transitions that define the beginning and end of the book. The earliest sources help to illustrate shifts that accelerated after 1973; the last ones reveal activist responses to the context of the September 11 attacks and the start of the Iraq War (part 3, section C, especially 3.C.9. through 3.C.12. and Makhijani snapshot).

The book contains four parts (1–4), each divided into three sections (A, B, and C). These parts and sections are organized to draw attention to distinct spaces and levels of struggle. While each part highlights particular themes, our approach rejects rigid boundaries of identity and ideology. For example, LGBT/queer, Black, and Latinx radicalisms appear across all chapters, as do anarchist, socialist, and other approaches.

Part 1, "Bodies and Lives," examines struggles over bodily autonomy, reproductive labor, and the context of rising conservatism. Section A of part 1, "Feminist and Queer Flashpoints," documents the growth of intersectional feminisms and the expanding boundaries of gender and sexual politics. Issues illustrating these shifts include reproductive justice, sexual violence and the carceral state, HIV/AIDS, queer of color organizing, sex work, and trans activism. Section B, "Fighting the Right," shows how activists defended hard-won gains against conservative mobilization. Struggles represented include affirmative action, reproductive freedom, censorship, and alliances against racist, homophobic, and sexist attacks. Finally, section C, "Labors of Survival," addresses labor and social welfare, particularly as linked with health and disability, women and queer workers, and welfare rights.

Part 2, "Walls and Gates," focuses on activism challenging the punitive state, especially against political repression (section A, "Resisting Repression), mass incarceration (section B, "Undermining the Prison State"), and the privatization of urban space (section C, "Fight for the City"). In more practical terms, this section centers on activism confronting prisons, policing, and state containment of radical movements. It situates these forms of radicalism alongside organizing to win control of urban space and local economies, as the multiracial urban working class moved from activism that challenged urban renewal to activism that opposed gentrification. In the 1970s capital fled the city, deepen-

ing urban crises. By the 1990s it returned to gentrify the city, making room for wealthy elites at the expense of working-class residents.[31]

Antiwar, international solidarity, and global justice movements are featured in part 3, "Borders and Maps." The organization of part 3 reflects how major changes in world politics—from the Cold War to globalization to the war on terror—shifted radical frameworks. If previously Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union had stood as guiding models, now international solidarity became oriented around Chile, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Palestine. These sites reflected opposition to US intervention, but also offered more flexible modes of socialism and articulated resistance against occupation and white supremacy. Immigrant radicals played critical roles in forging labor, anticapitalist, and antiwar networks. US-born radicals, too, traversed borders and rewrote the maps of social change. A range of struggles are represented in part 3 but with varying emphasis. Section A, "Anti-Imperialism beyond Vietnam," focuses especially on Central American solidarity. Section B, "From Anti-Imperialism to Global Justice," illustrates anti-apartheid, immigrant, and global justice organizing. And section C, "Not in Our Name," documents opposition to successive US interventions in the Middle East.

The book closes with documents illustrating how radicals imagined the future. Part 4, "Utopias and Dystopias," devotes concentrated attention to Indigenous politics and environmental radicalism. It also features many sources on praxis, including how to organize direct action (section A, "Stopping the End of the World") and how to relate to electoral politics and build mass politics in a neoliberal context (section B, "Left Visions in Transition"). Through this range, part 4 illustrates how widely definitions of radicalism have varied, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Some documents reflect traditional Western and Marxist boundaries and others challenge those understandings. Some sources equate anti-imperialism with solidarity with national liberation, while those in section C, "Land, Decolonization, Interdependence," look at forms of sovereignty and social organization beyond nation-states.

Remaking Radicalism provides a representative sample of the many approaches to fundamental social change that defined the turn of the new millennium. We invite readers to engage the anthology as befits their own questions, analyses, needs, and uses of the past.

Editorial Considerations

Due to space considerations, many of the documents in the book are excerpted rather than reproduced in full. Ellipses note where we have cut portions of the original text, whereas the same in brackets—[. . .]—denotes ellipses that appear in the original. We have prefaced each document with brief contextual notes and corrected minor spelling or grammatical mistakes but left intact purposefully alternative spellings or capitalizations (such as "Amerika"). We retained emphasis from the originals but replaced bolded fonts, larger fonts, or other formats with italics for the sake of uniformity and space. The book also includes

snapshot essays addressing important events, organizations, tactics, or networks. Written by a wide range of contemporary scholars and activists and arranged across the book, these snapshot essays offer a concise but focused look at special topics, often filling in gaps or narratives that cannot be explained by the documents themselves. Finally, we also include a handful of posters and graphics generated by and for activist campaigns. The book's bibliography provides a selected list of titles that directly informed our sense of the time period and that may be useful for further research.

We have prioritized documents for their accessibility—that is, documents that do not assume too much prior knowledge, that use minimal jargon, and that are not subsumed in debates that would be opaque to most contemporary readers. We have emphasized sources that demonstrate forms of action or that lay out political agendas rather than only explaining the forms of oppression they confront. We have emphasized breadth over depth, seeking to showcase a wide range of issues rather than drilling down into the nitty gritty of particular campaigns. With some exceptions, our focus on grassroots action has led us to deprioritize electoral politics, court rulings, and large nonprofits. Above all, we have sought to represent a wide mix of racial and ethnic communities, gender and sexual identities, geographic locations and political goals, and tactical approaches and strategic orientations. Nonetheless, by virtue of population density and our own research capacities, the book favors coastal hubs and existing archival sources and relies on sources originally published in English.

The format of a printed book has meant that we had to leave a lot out—including music, performance, graffiti, and most visual art. We feel these exclusions acutely; for us personally, as well as so many others, music and art were critical entry points into radical activism. However, we have found that written sources offer tremendous insight into the day-to-day work of movement building, and we look forward to ways that other scholars and activists might place the book in conversation with histories of hip-hop, punk, poster art, or political theater, to name a few examples.[32] Similarly, because we prioritized grassroots practice, the collection largely omits works by major scholarly theorists of the time period. The bibliography cites some key scholarship.

Copyright law and reproduction costs posed certain limitations on the book. The copyright holder of some artifacts of radicalism is a corporate entity rather than the author or creator of the source; in some cases, such rights holders charge exorbitant reproduction fees. We lacked external funding for the book, and there were several items we were unable to include due to costs.

The internet makes a book such as this both less and more complicated: it has made some documents easier to find and enabled us to find many sources through email contacts with colleagues and comrades. But it has often made it difficult to correctly date sources or locate their origin, particularly in the context of collective and anonymous authorship. Activists in the 1990s left many sources online, while some of those in the 1970s and 1980s still barely register in the digital world. Observing these constraints, we have sought to mostly feature sources that are not available online. Exceptions primarily reflect documents'

scale of impact or significance. Our website, *www.remakingradicalism.org*, offers links to other sources and to archives.

The 1973 to 2001 period is recent enough and activism in this period so decentralized that institutions are still physically locating documents and individuals are still determining what sources were most influential. Beyond collecting published materials, archives of radicalism generally depend on activists to donate their personal collections, and archivists may exert influence through their own political interests and relationships. Like people, archives can be eccentric and partial. They reproduce racial, gender, class, and other hierarchies in their funding, structures, and cultures. Whether activists save their materials and where they donate them are choices shaped by everything from storage space and housing access to perception of value. Countless activist materials are lost daily to the same structures of violence and inequality that radicals confront in their organizing.

We have aimed to locate a usable past amid chaotic times—or, more precisely, to curate one. We began developing this project during the tail end of the first Obama administration and completed it in the third year of the Trump administration. The years in between saw an array of fantastic scholarship that consistently revised our thinking. Even more influential to our approach were world events themselves. Any book is a product of the time it was created as much as the time it records. The 2016 election and its aftermath prompted us to turn greater attention to efforts at thwarting the vigilante right and its electoral power, while the activism of Indigenous water protectors at Standing Rock accentuated our focus on Native demands for ecological sustainability as a critical element of anticolonial sovereignty.[33]

These concerns were of more than passing interest. We would have completed the book faster had we not taken time to participate in protests against the expanded violence of deportation, incarceration, climate crisis, and privatization, and to build communities of resistance and support. Our efforts to trace the remaking of radicalism historically join our efforts, not only as historians but as human beings, to renew possibility in our contemporary moment. We claim no decisive victory in either effort. Yet we remain dedicated to the world of peace, justice, sustainability, and liberation that radicals of every generation pursue.

NOTES

1. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*; Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality?*.

2. Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past"; Dixon, *Another Politics*; Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*.

3. Universalist critiques gained prominence among liberal critics in the 1990s reflecting on the 1960s; see, for example, Gitlin, *Twilight of Common Dreams* and Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*. Jefferson Cowie reanimated this critique in *Stayin' Alive*, his history of the white working class in the 1970s. It reappeared in the wake of the 2016 election, notably in the pages of the socialist journal *Jacobin*. For critiques of this approach, see Duggan, *Twilight of Equality*, Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, and Taylor, *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*. For narratives of declension, reaction, and frac-

ture, see Rodgers, *Age of Fracture*, and Kruse and Zelizer, *Fault Lines*. For how transformations in capitalism anchored certain new intellectual horizons in this era, see Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*.

4. Thanks to Jenna Loyd for helping us think through this particular phrasing.

5. See for example Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 2.

6. Gilmore, *Golden Gulag*; MacLean, *Democracy in Chains*; MacLean, *Freedom Is Not Enough*; Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*; Chappell, The *War on the Welfare Family*. On neoliberalism as an attack on politics, see Brown, *Undoing the Demos*.

7. See especially Duggan, The *Twilight of Equality?*, and Ahmed, *On Being Included*.

8. Cebul, Geismer, and Williams, *Shaped by the State*; Brown, *Undoing the Demos*.

9. Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*; Hudson, *Super Imperialism*; Kornbluh and Mink, *Ensuring Poverty*; Briggs, *How All Politics Became Reproductive Politics*; HoSang, *Racial Propositions*; Ross et al., *Radical Reproductive Justice*; Hobson, *Lavender and Red*; Brier, *Infectious Ideas*; Carroll, *Mobilizing New York*; Gould, *Moving Politics*.

10. Johnson, *From Revolutionaries to Race Leaders*; Taylor, *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*.

11. Beal, "Double Jeopardy"; Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins"; Taylor, *How We Get Free*; Anzaldúa and Moraga, *This Bridge Called My Back*; Collins and Bilge, *Intersectionality*; Hancock, *Intersectionality*. On the development of intersectional analysis in movement contexts, see Roth, *Separate Roads to Feminism*, Springer, *Living for the Revolution*, Hobson, *Lavender and Red*, and Bost, *Evidence of Being*, among others.

12. Hall, "The Problem of Ideology." For critiques of the liberal welfare state and liberal citizenship, see, for example, Murakawa, *The First Civil Right*, Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*, and Cacho, *Social Death*.

13. Bookchin, *Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left*; Danaher, *Corporations Are Gonna Get Your Mama*; Dixon, *Another Politics*; Hardt and Negri, *Empire*; Khasnabish, *Zapatistas*; Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders*; Ponce de León, *Our Word Is Our Weapon*.

14. Brenner, Brenner, and Winslow, *Rebel Rank and File*.

15. Critical overviews of the Reagan years include Rossinow, *The Reagan Era*, and Martin, *The Other Eighties*.

16. On Clinton, see Bacevich, *American Empire*; Reed, *Without Justice for All*; Robinson, *Superpredator*.

17. Boyette and Boyette, *Let It Burn*.

18. Berger, *Captive Nation*; Felker-Kantor, *Policing Los Angeles*; Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*; Vitale, *The End of Policing*; Schrader, *Badges without Borders*.

19. Whitlock and Bronski, *Considering Hate*.

20. Singh, *Race and America's Long War*.

21. Burbach and Tarbell, *Imperial Overstretch*; Finlay, *George W. Bush and the War on Women*; Maira, *The 9/11 Generation*.

22. Kelley, *Freedom Dreams*.

23. Michael Harrington, quoted in Cowie, "'Vigorously Left, Right, and Center,'" 76; Brick and Phelps, *Radicals in America*, 315. More broadly on this transformation, see Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*.

24. On the connections between welfare and incarceration in the 1970s, see Kohler-Hausmann, *Getting Tough*.

25. Clawson, *The Next Upsurge*.

26. INCITE!, *The Revolution Will Not Be Funded*; Beam, *Gay, Inc.*

27. Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air*; Epstein, Political Protest and *Cultural Revolution*; Cornell, *Oppose and Propose; Fithian,* Shut it Down.

28. The best-known discussion of antiracism in the global justice movement is Martinez, "Where Was the Color in Seattle?" We did not include this essay here due to reproduction costs, but it can be accessed at https://www.colorlines.com/articles /where-was-color-seattlelooking-reasons-why-great-battle-was-so-white.

29. Kauffman, *Direct Action*; Shepard and Hayduk, *From ACT UP to the WTO*; Solnit, *Globalize Liberation*; Fithian, *Shut it Down.*

30. Berger, *Outlaws of America*; Berger, *Captive Nation*; Burton-Rose, *Guerrilla USA*; Fernandez, *Prisoners of Colonialism*; Pickering, *The Earth Liberation Front.* For a look at how violence anchored the rise of the right-wing white power movement, see Belew, *Bring the War Home*; Berlet and Lyons, *Right-Wing Populism in America*; Burke, *Revolutionaries of the Right.*

31. Smith, *New Urban Frontier.*

32. For some examples of that work to date, see Greenwald, MacPhee, and Exit Art, *Signs of Change*; Martin, *The Other Eighties*; Chang, *Who We Be*; Bost, *Evidence of Being*; Cvetkovich, *An Archive of Feeling*; Duncombe, *Subcultures Reader.*

33. For other histories contextualizing Standing Rock as part of a long history of Indigenous resistance, see Cobb, *Say We Are Nations*, and Estes, *Our History Is the Future.*